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Introduction
The broad use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in almost every 
part of daily life produces a huge amount of data. Personal data of the user or of people 
involved constitute a major part of the data stored and processed. They reveal a lot about 
the users’ behaviour and help creating a picture of people’s personal lifestyles. Data stem 
from economic enterprises as well as from state surveillance systems, and together they 
manifest a threat to privacy. These new threats can no longer be dealt with by legal means 
alone; rather, interdisciplinarity is the key word. Since the erosion of privacy is a fundamental 
problem for liberal democracies, we need combined efforts and a common understanding 
of the value of privacy among engineers, political and social scientists and decision-makers 
in private enterprises as well as in the public domain. To take these considerations into 
account is to be considered part and parcel of responsible research and innovation; there-
fore, we have to develop new ways to secure privacy in a networked world.
This bookcontribution will present new approaches to incorporate privacy-oriented 
thinking and PETs1 principles early into the design-process. The starting point is the idea 
that even in data protection it is cheaper to decide on the fundamental design earlier in 
the process rather than applying end-of-pipe solutions to ensure that a product or service 
complies with legal requirements or to gain acceptance on the market. These approaches 
will be discussed along with the results from two recent research projects ITA was involved 
in: PRISE2 und EuroPriSe3.
TA and Privacy
According to von Schomberg (in this book), technology assessment is a relevant method in 
the product dimension of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). Presenting two recent 
research projects of the Institute of Technology Assessment (ITA) of the Austrian Academy 
of Sciences, this paper shows how technology assessment can feed into RRI processes. 
Before going into detail I will give a short overview over the Institute and TA in general.
The Institute of Technology Assessment of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (ITA) is an 
interdisciplinary research institution that investigates the relationship of technology and 
society and especially is interested in the impacts on society of the widespread use of new 
technology. The institute’s work is devoted to academic analysis as well as to policy advice in 
technology-related issues. One of the main areas of work is to analyse the impacts of new 
ICT applications on society. Important areas of work are privacy, e-governance and networked 
environments. Apart from the focus on the information society, ITA deals with technology 
and sustainability as well as with the governance of controversial technologies such as 
biotechnology, nanotechnology and new emerging technologies for human enhancement.
Technology assessment is an interdisciplinary concept, which provides policy advice for 
technology and research policy. The potential impacts of technology use are analysed in 
1	 Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs)
2		 http://prise.oeaw.ac.at 
3	 https://www.european-privacy-seal.eu/ 
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several dimensions and, if possible, alternatives are described. Technology assessment 
is always pro-active and constructive in contributing solutions to societal problems. 
Technology assessment was first established in the USA as an independent and impartial 
instrument of policy advice for the Senate in the early 70s of the 20th century. Today in 
Europe, 18 TA institutions work for their respective regional or national parliaments. These 
parliamentary technology assessment institutions are organised within EPTA4. On the 
European level, the STOA Panel5 serves the European Parliament. The STOA secretariat is 
supported by members of the European Technology Assessment Group (ETAG)6.
In TA we distinguish between different basic approaches: a) technology induced studies 
analyse potential impacts of the broad implementation of certain technologies and their 
potential alternatives; b) problem induced approaches focus on societal problems and 
search for technological or organisational solutions for the problems found; c) project 
oriented approaches focus on impacts of concrete projects like energy-plants.
With regard to privacy we use a problem-oriented approach based on empirical evidence 
for the erosion of the fundamental right to privacy due to the widespread use of ICT facili-
tates (vgl. Tichy/Peissl 2001; Klüver 2006; Peissl 2007; Sterbik-Lamina et al. 2009). Studies in 
this domain try to find technological, organisational or legal measures to halt the ongoing 
erosion of privacy. In addition, we investigate how technological and societal developments 
as described later may change our attitudes towards privacy.
Technological and societal developments
Over the last decades, three lines of development characterised the technological progress 
in the domain of ICT. Rendering everything digital resulted in a qualitative change, making 
many applications possible and revolutionising others. The digitisation of analogue 
communication systems enabled and accelerated the convergence of information- and 
communication systems. At the same time, privacy became an important issue. The techno-
logical development necessitated the implementation of further measures in order to keep 
up with legal requirements. For instance in old analogue telephone systems, the connec-
tion data disappeared with the end of the communication process. In digital systems, you 
have to save the addresses of all communication partners as a technical requirement. To 
comply with data protection rules, you have to design the system to include additional 
automatic erasure routines.
The second important line of development was minimisation. The computing power of 
1970s’ big machines is nowadays contained in tiny PDAs and smartphones. This is, of course, 
not the end of minimisation. Thinking of RFID tags7 and the concept of the Internet of 
things (Commission of the European Communities 2009; ITU 2005) we see an ongoing 
development towards smaller or even irrecognisable devices. Minimisation, at the same 
4	 http://www.eptanetwork.org/EPTA/ 
5	 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/default_en.htm 
6	 http://www.itas.fzk.de/etag 
7	 RFID: Radio Frequency IDentification
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time, paved the way for decentralised computational power. Some of the early data protec-
tion laws in Europe (e. g. in Austria) are more or less based on the idea of securing data 
in a centrally locked computer centre. This is why modern data protection laws have to 
focus much more on the so-called informational self-determination. A centralistic concept 
of “data protection“ no longer matches the conditions of modern decentralised data 
processing.
This development is accelerated by the third big technological line of development: 
networking. Establishing the universal Internet protocol (IP) actually enabled every user to 
be connected and to exchange data all over the world within seconds. This raised new chal-
lenges to data protection in a globalised world.
Summing up we may say that digitisation, minimisation and networking built a totally 
new framework for privacy policy.
However, not only technological developments contribute to the erosion of privacy. There 
are at least two other ambivalent developments in society. On the one hand we can see a 
higher sensibility for data protection issues, which basically popped up in public debate 
after huge data losses occurred in several European countries. On the other hand, we face 
a new trend in communication. In web 2.0 applications or so-called social media platforms 
millions of users share information rather unscrupulously even on a very private level. 
Social scientists increasingly become interested in the long-term impacts of such a behav-
iour (see Sterbik-Lamina et al. 2009; Klüver 2006). 
Developments after the terrorist attacks in New York, London and Madrid were even more 
important. Globally, we recognised a hype of surveillance demands to prevent future terrorist 
attacks – surveillance mostly served as a synonym for security. As an over-reaction, this 
entailed new regulation that endangered privacy (see Peissl 2005). Recent studies demon-
strated that security and privacy are not necessarily a zero sum game (Raguse et al. 2008).
This short overview on technological and societal developments shows how endan-
gered the fundamental right of privacy is. Are there any ways to cope? Since in the future, 
technology design will play a more important role, the “Privacy by Design“ approach by 
Cavoukian (2009) as well as the results of the PRISE project8 can be considered important 
steps. In addition, it will be necessary to promote research and development and, in partic-
ular, to implement so-called Privacy Enhanhcing Technologies (PETs) (Klüver 2006).
The technological and societal developments, of course, need to be mirrored in a modern 
data protection directive, which is under discussion right now.
Hypotheses and solutions
In order to structure the discussion of possible ways to overcome the challenges to privacy, 
we present three hypotheses as starting points:
8	 http://prise.oeaw.ac.at 
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Hypothesis 1: Privacy is a fundamental right. Today, it is jeopardised in various ways and can 
no longer be enforced by legal means alone. Reasons are the very low level of users’ aware-
ness of ICT and the lacking resources of data protection authorities (Cas/Peissl 2000; Cas et 
al. 2002; Klüver 2006; Sterbik-Lamina et al. 2009). 
Hypothesis 2: Privacy increasingly is on the political agenda. Indicators may be found, on 
the one hand, in the media coverage of data-loss scandals around Europe, the low level 
of acceptance of the data-retention directive and the protests against its implementation 
in several European countries. On the other hand, the European Commission continues 
to issue calls for data protection research and to finance pilot projects like the EuroPriSe 
project. On a global level, there are developments to establish a kind of data-protection 
standard (Bennett/Raab 2003). 
Hypothesis 3: Privacy often is seen as a cost factor only. The main line of argument is that 
data protection systems cost money and cannot be afforded in a globally competitive market. 
It may be true that the adaptations needed to make an IT system comply with data protec-
tion regulation or to gain acceptance on the market are rather costly. However, in contrast 
to this end-of-pipe approach, we argue that the “privacy by design” approach is more cost-
efficient. Early implementing privacy-oriented thinking in the design process does not cost 
much and “built-in-privacy” is an added quality feature of the respective IT product. As 
success in global markets is no longer solely dependent on competitive pricing, “privacy” as 
a new quality feature is a comparative advantage for those who include it at an early stage. 
The success of the data protection seals in Schleswig-Holstein9 and the European Privacy 
Seal may serve as an indication how successful this kind of thinking already is10.
Summing up, privacy should be seen as a quality feature of IT products and services; and 
privacy can no longer be guaranteed by legal means alone. Therefore, pro-active and 
constructive approaches are necessary. Two such approaches will be presented in the 
following chapters: first, the “engineer-oriented” approach takes up standards and guide-
lines from IT security and enhances them by catering for the privacy dimension. The aim 
is to incorporate privacy know-how as early as possible into the design process. Secondly, 
the “market-oriented” approach stands for self-regulation, audit schemes and quality seals.
The PRISE Approach
The PRISE project aimed at defining criteria for privacy-friendly security technology research 
funded by the EC in the framework of PASR11. The PRISE approach shows how privacy can 
be designed into security technologies, and how privacy considerations can be operational-
ised within the research and development process and the deployment phase of a security 
product.
9	 https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de 
10	 https://www.european-privacy-seal.eu 
11	 Preparatory Action on Security Research
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By applying this evaluation procedure produced for Framework Programme 7, certain 
generalizations can be made. The method selected was a combination of classic expert 
Technology Assessments featuring the analysis of literature and documents, together with 
participative approaches. 
The participative approaches had two components: on the one hand, two stakeholder 
workshops were held with representatives of industry, science, and users of security tech-
nologies to discuss the research design and provisional results. The other component 
comprised so-called “Interview meetings”12 carried out in six European countries13. The 
main purpose was to stimulate an “informed debate” on the subject with approximately 
160 participants and to discover their basic views, in particular lines of argument, and to 
determine how these might be changed. During the preparation the participants were 
introduced to several scenarios on the subject. After an introductory talk, the participants 
were asked to fill in a comprehensive questionnaire. Using a list of questions, the subject 
was subsequently discussed in small groups.
The results showed a high level of consensus among the non-specialist groups in all coun-
tries. Among the key statements made, for example, was that a threat from terrorism does 
not justify an infringement of privacy, that technologies invading the very private (intimate) 
sphere are unacceptable, and that the abuse of security technologies ought to be prevented. 
Of special relevance – as a distinguishing feature between countries – was the degree of 
trust people had in various institutions. The independent judiciary, in particular, enjoys a 
high degree of public confidence, which was also reflected in the list of values participants 
considered to improve acceptance of security technologies. Top of the list was the principle 
of proportionality, which would only appear to be assured if certain supervisory measures 
were legally permitted subject to strict checks. The fear of possible abuse was indicated by 
the demand for strict controls, and by the emphasis people placed on security technologies 
infringing privacy being implemented as a last resort only. More generally, an informative 
and open debate on the subject was called for, which should involve as many concerned 
groups as possible, as well as an obligatory analysis of the implementation effects of such 
technologies (see Jacobi/Holst 2008).
The key result of PRISE is the so-called PRISE matrix. It is an evaluation instrument for meas-
uring the expected effects of a new security technology in three stages. The three stages 
investigated are the so-called baseline	 of	 personal	 life, which comprises very personal – 
intimate – data and which, as a matter of principle, should be free from any surveillance. 
The second area is about data	protection	compliance, i.e. how already existing principles are 
applied, and the third area deals with context-sensitive	trade-offs. The latter area examines 
whether a security technology apparently infringing privacy justifiably promises a suffi-
cient security gain.
There are several evaluation stages in the course of designing a system or evaluating a 
project. If the initial evaluation of the project idea renders the conclusion that the first 
or second area is not catered for satisfactorily, there is a package of measures contrib-
uting to alleviating a recognised privacy problem, as summarised in the so-called PRISE 
12	 A short description of interview meetings can be found on the website of the Danish Board of 
Technology: http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?article=1234&toppic=kategori12&language=uk 
13	 Denmark, Norway, Germany, Spain, Hungary and Austria
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Handbook. Three types of instruments are available – legal, technical and organisational 
–, which are also described in the report (Raguse et al. 2008).
Using the matrix together with two checklists, which enable a quick evaluation to be 
made, an attempt was made to develop guidelines and support for product proposing 
enterprises, for evaluators, and for research and development teams in general. The PRISE 
matrix and the PRISE Handbook can, however, also provide users of security technolo-
gies with valuable information on an ICT use that complies with basic law and enhances 
privacy.
Taken together, it was possible to show that security and privacy do not necessarily 
exclude each other and that it is possible to endorse both at the same time, provided 
design principles are appropriately complied with..
The PRISE results were presented at an international conference, where representa-
tives of the security technology industry, users, NGOs and representatives from the 
scientific community discussed them. The conference concluded with the presentation 
of a Statement Paper14, summarising the project team’s and its international advisory 
committee’s main results in terms of recommendations for action and policy options. 
The Statement Paper contains the following conclusions and recommendations: 
i) An inviolable baseline	of	privacy needs to be established. ii) There is no linear, inter-
changeable relationship between privacy and security, and the relationship between 
them is not	a	zero-sum	game. iii) Minimising the processing of personal data is an impor-
tant principle of data protection. iv) The	consolidation	of	databases in order to analyse 
the behaviour of the entire population breaches the principle of the presumption of 
innocence and the principle of proportionality. v) The protection of privacy is the shared 
responsibility of all involved, and observance of privacy	 should	be	a	key	non-functional	
requirement of security technologies. vi) In addition, the criteria for evaluating security 
technologies must be continuously	developed and regulations should be introduced for a 
limited time and continuously reassessed (see Čas 2008).
The European Privacy Seal 
After the description of the “engineer-oriented” approach we now present a brief descrip-
tion of the “market-oriented” approach, based on the example of the EuroPriSe project15, 
which focuses on conditions for introducing a European Privacy Seal. Such a privacy 
quality seal is intended to certify “that an IT product or IT based service facilitates the use 
of that product or service in a way compliant with European regulations on privacy and 
data protection, taking into account the legislation in the pilot countries.” (Bock 2009)
The project had several aims. Firstly, it was concerned with a market analysis, which was 
intended to assess the extent to which a European privacy seal might be viable on its 
own without subsidies from certification fees, and whether it would be able to succeed 
in the market. The second aim was to promote awareness of data protection issues 
14	 http://prise.oeaw.ac.at/docs/PRISE_Statement_Paper.pdf 
15	 https://www.european-privacy-seal.eu 
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among manufacturers. The most challenging theoretical task was to develop criteria for 
evaluating data protection friendliness at a European level. EU Directive 95/46 already 
provides a standard framework for data protection legislation, but member states vary 
widely in interpreting it. The project succeeded in establishing a common set of criteria 
based on the European framework (Bock et al. 2009). It also undertook to collect existing 
experience regarding the European certification of products and services and European 
admission criteria for the relevant experts. 
The specific aims of the seal are to promote data protection per se, to improve consumer 
trust in IT products and services, to contribute to greater transparency in data processing 
and to demonstrate theoretically and empirically a possible competitive advantage for 
products complying with data protection, carried out using the ROSI model – Return 
on Security Investment (Borking 2009). In addition, EuroPriSe aimed to simplify the 
certification procedure for businesses interested in data protection, since a certifica-
tion recognised throughout Europe would abolish multiple certification requirements, 
rendering immediate effects.
The certification procedure is largely based on the privacy seal the Independent Centre 
for Privacy Protection Schleswig-Holstein (ICPP/ULD) established in 2002. The procedure 
comprises two stages, which are voluntary in principle but regulated by law. In each case 
the manufacturer or vendor of a product and/or service to be certified selects a legal 
and a technical expert from a register of accredited experts. Together they agree the 
“Target of Evaluation” (ToE). At this stage, initial contact is made with the certification 
body to clarify the ToE. Subsequently, the two experts begin their independent evalua-
tion of the product or service. Once the evaluation has been concluded the manufacturer 
submits the report to the certifying body, which carries out its own examination of the 
report. If the result of the examination is positive, the seal is awarded and a short report 
is published on the Seal Homepage. It is important that the entire procedure remains 
confidential, that no business secrets are contained in the published short report, and 
that any negative examination results are not made public.
The only costs incurred by the business enterprise are the fees for the two experts and 
the fee charged by the certifying body.
A key factor in this process is the criteria used in certification. The fundamental question 
is: can the product or service be designed so that its use will comply with data protection? 
This refers in particular to settings, configurations and also to the pertaining documen-
tation. The European Privacy Seal particularly emphasises the combination of law and 
technology. The certification criteria have been worked out in great detail and are also 
published in a comprehensive catalogue (Bock et al. 2009). They basically follow the 
standard principles of data protection such as the legitimacy of data processing, purpose 
limitation, data subjects’ rights, transparency and auditability, data minimisation and 
avoidance, as well as data security.
Ever since it was launched the project proved surprisingly popular with experts as well as 
with manufacturers. No fewer than 110 experts from ten countries attended the training 
seminars to be trained, examined and accredited. Austria currently has twelve experts. A 
total of 19 pilot certification processes had been initiated, which in the meantime have 
resulted in the award of 15 seals.
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Conclusion
The starting point for this article was the question of how to manage responsible research 
and innovation with regard to ICT development and privacy. Based on the evidence that 
privacy protection can no longer be assured by legal means, attempts have been made to 
find alternative solutions. These have shown that (new) instruments for ensuring privacy 
protection do already exist. On the one hand, design-oriented assistance supports early 
compliance with data protection aspects in the design phase, involving only minimal addi-
tional costs. Fitting an IT system with PETs can qualify as a quality feature providing the 
product a competitive advantage, which is reflected in a positive Return-on-Investment 
(ROI). On the other hand, market-oriented mechanisms of self-regulation such as the 
Quality Seal can contribute to greater transparency on the market. 
Particular responsibility falls to the policy-makers and those areas of public procurement 
that purchase large IT systems or are responsible for providing widely used IT applications. 
There is a particular potential in so-called “sensitive” areas such as, for example, security 
applications in the fight against crime, in e-government and, above all, in e-health.
Finally, the arguments and results discussed above are summarised in four messages: 
1) Security and privacy do not not necessarily exclude each other; security technolo-
gies can often be designed in such a way that they fulfil their function and enhance 
security without, at the same time, infringing the fundamental right of privacy.
2) The debate about data protection and privacy thus far has been concerned with 
legalities almost exclusively. It now needs to be widened to include technical and 
social scientific aspects. This broader perspective has become necessary because of 
both, technological developments and changes in society. It would therefore appear 
helpful if, in future, we were to speak about privacy protection rather than “just” data 
protection. 
3) The well trained and powerful statutory regulations in Europe are needed as a 
“support”, but it would be insufficient to rely on them exclusively. We need to 
remember that statutory regulation only makes sense if it can be enforced. This 
means that data protection authorities need to be equipped with the technology and 
the legal resources required being able to adequately meet new challenges. 
4) Additional instruments and incentives need to be used. These include the promotion 
of the “privacy by design” approach and the use of the PRISE matrix tools, of Privacy 
Impact Assessments (PIA) etc. This represents a key task for public procurement and 
funding agencies. Also, from today’s perspective it is clear that there is a great poten-
tial for the implementation of self-regulation instruments such as, for example, data 
protection audits and quality seals. An additional and still too little funded public task 
is raising relevant awareness – including a debate of privacy issues and of the inalien-
able right to privacy at an early stage in schools –, which will play an important part 
in future privacy protection activities.
With a package of measures, an interdisciplinary approach and the appropriate polit-
ical will at European as well as nation state level, it should be possible, in the future, to 
preserve the fundamental right of privacy so important for our democracies. 
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